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ANAMARIA NICOLAE
CHARLES NOLAN
The Impact of Imperfect Credibility in a Transition
to Price Stability
In this paper we study the impact of a temporary lack of credibility in a
transition to price stability. We quantify the effects of a period of disinflation
on temporary output losses, and the impact of the lack of credibility on the
optimal speed of disinflation. We demonstrate that the “disinflationary
booms” found by Ball (1994) and Ireland (1997) may or may not disappear
in an environment with imperfect credibility, depending on the speed of
learning relative to the speed of disinflation. Finally, we enquire whether
the speed of the Volcker disinflation was excessive or not.
JEL codes: E20, E32, F32, F41
Keywords: price stability, imperfect credibility, optimal speed of disinflation.
In this paper we study the effects of a disinflationary mone-
tary policy when policy makers are committed to price stability in the strict sense of
achieving and maintaining a constant price-level. The analysis takes place in an
environment where the supply-side of the economy is characterized by monopolisti-
cally competitive firms, and where there is rigidity in the setting of prices. Recent
research has revealed much about the effects of monetary contraction in such an
environment.
For our purpose, three broad results stand out from this work. First, in the periods
following a contraction in the money stock, real output is likely to fall below its (now
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altered) long-run equilibrium level. Second, a gradual disinflation may actually
result in output, after its initial decline, rising above its new steady state level,
and remaining so for some time. And finally, it is optimal to end high inflations
quickly, low inflations gradually, and maintain inflation at or near zero, thereafter.
The key papers that develop these results are Ball (1994), Ireland (1997), King and
Wollman (1999), and Khan, King, and Wollman (2003). Important precursors to
the analytical foundations of these results are contained in Danziger (1988), Benabou
and Konieczny (1994), and Lucas and Stokey (1983), while the contributions of
Sargent (1982) and Gordon (1982), as emphasized by Ireland, provide an important
focus on policy implications of differential speeds of disinflation.
The theoretical papers just mentioned, and many others besides, assume perfect
foresight (or rational expectations). For some purposes this assumption is obviously
appropriate: what other assumption makes sense when one wishes to analyze an
economic model in, or in a close neighborhood of, an unchanging steady state?
However, the assumption of perfect foresight may be less attractive when one wishes
to analyze the effects of ‘large’ changes in policy. For one thing, the steady state
of the model may well be changing. In addition, policymakers may not enjoy
complete credibility. In this paper we examine the effects of a disinflationary mone-
tary policy when policymakers initially do not enjoy complete credibility, and
where the steady state of the economy is changing. We model the monetary poli-
cymakers as doggedly pursuing the goal of price stability in the face of this imperfect,
but improving, credibility.
Two important recent contributions address some of the issues we do. The first
is that of Ball (1995). He demonstrates that if credibility is sufficiently low, a period
of disinflation may lead to expected output losses. In his model agents harbour a
nagging suspicion that the authorities will renege and give up on the path of
disinflation. He models agents’ scepticism as a constant conditional probability
of reneging. This may be a somewhat rigid way of modelling the evolution of
agents’ priors. On the one hand, as the disinflation proceeds it is plausible that agents
accord increasing weight to the announced path for the money supply. On the
other hand, perhaps as the disinflation proceeds and the extent of nominal rigidity
in the economy optimally rises, the authorities may be more likely to renege (to
exploit a flattening of the Phillips curve). Ex ante both of these cases seem intuitively
plausible, and so we propose an ‘expectations updating rule’ that nests these alterna-
tives. The distinction between these two cases can be important, as we demonstrate
below. In addition, Ball (1995) leaves to one side the issue of the optimal speed of
disinflation under imperfect credibility, a topic we take up here.
The second related paper is by Ireland (1995). He also finds that higher output
losses are the price of imperfect credibility during a period of disinflation. However,
the attainment of price stability is desirable (i.e., welfare enhancing) in general,
except when the loss of seigniorage is replaced in the low inflation state by a rise
in other distortionary taxes. Again, his modelling of the expectations formation
process misses the effects to which we have just referred. In addition, we examine
ANAMARIA NICOLAE AND CHARLES NOLAN : 49
the issue of a lack of credibility in a more complex, but now standard, supply-
side with a continuum of monopolistically competitive producers. This set up leads
to some computational complexities related to the optimal choice of prices by
firms who not only have to forecast future demand and cost conditions, but also
have to forecast their covariances. This may be why these other authors employ
somewhat simpler supply-sides in their set-ups. We also extend Ireland’s (1997)
calculation of the optimal speed of disinflation to the case of imperfect credibility,
and enquire whether or not imperfect credibility materially impacts on the optimal
speed of disinflation, as compared to the situation under perfect foresight. This is
a question of first-order policy importance but which, to our knowledge, has not
been addressed hitherto in the class of models employed here, and which is proving
popular for policy-oriented analyses.
In the next section we outline our model and discuss its salient features. In Section
2 we display some benchmark results that demonstrate the three key points we
mentioned above. In Section 3 we propose our expectations updating rule. In Section 4
we analyze the impact of imperfect credibility during a period of disinflation. In
Section 5 we use our model to analyze the Volcker disinflation. Given the actual
course of disinflation during this period, we back out the implied speed of learning
of agents in the economy (by matching the output gap of our model to a measure of
the actual U.S. output gap during this period). Given the implied speed of learning,
we then compare the speed of the Volcker disinflation with the optimal speed of
disinflation. In Section 6 we discuss our results and offer some thoughts on areas
for future research.
1. THE MODEL
1.1 The Representative Agent
Our basic framework extends the perfect foresight model of Ireland (1997). Its
component parts are now familiar in the literature and so we can develop the key
equations somewhat briskly. The economy consists of many identical consumers.
Each period a representative agent makes plans for consumption and leisure/labour
such that (expected) present discounted value of utility is maximized. This measure
of utility is given by
E0
∞
t0
βt {C1αt  11  α  γNt} α,γ  0 , (1)
and is separable in consumption, Ct, and labour supply, Nt. β ∈ (0, 1) is a discount
factor. Following Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), Ct is defined over a continuum of goods,
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Ct  [10 ct(i)b1b di]
b
b1
b  0 , (2)
where, ct(i) denotes, in equilibrium, the number of units of each good i from firm
i that the representative agent consumes. b is the price elasticity of demand. pt(i)
is the nominal price at which firm i must sell output on demand during time t. The
Dixit–Stiglitz aggregate price-level, Pt, at time t is given by:
Pt  [10 pt(i)1b di]
1
1b
. (3)
Let Nt be given by:
Nt  
1
0
nt(i) di ,
where, nt(i) denotes the quantity of labour supplied by the household to each firm
i, at the nominal wage Wt, during each period. This assumption means that households
effectively supply a portion of labour to all firms. The reason why we need such an
assumption (and the one below regarding the representative agent’s share portfolio) is
to ensure that the marginal utility of wealth equalizes across agents.
Each period, the representative agent faces a budget constraint of the following
sort:

1
0
[Qt(i)st1(i)  Φt(i)  Wtnt(i)] di ≥ 
1
0
[pt(i)ct(i)  Qt(i)st(i)] di . (4)
Here Qt(i) denotes the nominal price of a share in firm i, st denotes the quantity of
shares, Φt(i) di  Dt(i)st(i), where Dt(i) is the dividend associated with a unit share,
and 10 pt(i)ct(i) di  PtCt denotes total nominal expenditure. We assume that for
t  0, s
–1(i)  1, for all i ∈ [0, 1]. In effect, then, we are assuming that each
household owns an equal share of all the firms. The constraint (Equation 4) says
that each period (and, under uncertainty, in each state of nature) income (financial
plus labour) can be worth no less then the value of expenditure (on non-durable
consumption plus financial investment). The household problem, then, is to
choose ct(i), nt(i), st(i), and total consumption, Ct, such as to maximize Equation
(1) subject to the sequence of constraints (Equation 4), and the relevant initial
and transversality conditions. Optimal household behaviour is described by the
requirement that household consumption spending must be optimally allocated across
differentiated goods at each point in time (i.e., the optimal ct(i)). It can be shown
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that the Dixit–Stiglitz preference relation requires that purchases of each good
i satisfies:
ct(i)  Ct (pt(i)Pt )b . (5)
As in Ireland (1997) it will simplify things somewhat if we let aggregate nominal
magnitudes be determined in equilibrium by a quantity-type relation:
Mt  
1
0
Pt(i)ct(i) di  PtCt . (6)
An interior optimum for the agent’s problem will include Equation (4) with equality,
Equation (5) for all i, Equation (6) and the following conditions:
Cαt  λtPt ; (7)
γ  λtWt . (8)
And for all i
Qt(i)  Dt(i)  βEt(λt1 /λt)Qt1(i) , (9)
where λt is an unknown multiplier associated with Equation (4).
1.2 The Corporate Sector
There is a continuum of firms indexed by i over the unit interval, each of them
producing a different, perishable consumption good. So, goods may also be indexed
by i ∈ [0, 1], where firm i produces good i.
Each firm i sells shares, at the beginning of each period t, at the nominal
price Qt(i), and pays, at the end of the period, the nominal dividend Dt(i). The
representative household trades the number of shares that it owns, st(i), in each of
the firms at the end of each period t. Under market clearing, st(i)  1, ∀i ∈ [0, 1],
in each period. Firms are able to change prices each period, subject to a fixed cost.
As a consequence, in equilibrium firms will not necessarily be willing to change
prices in each period. The criterion for the price-setting decision at time t is to
maximize the return to shareholders.
At time t we assume that firms are divided into two categories, such that firms
from the first category can freely change their prices, p1,t(i), while the firms belong-
ing to the second must sell output at the same price set a period before,
p2,t(i)  p2,t1 (i), unless they pay the fixed cost k  0, measured in terms of labour.
At time t  1, the roles are reversed and the first set of firms keep prices unchanged,
p1,t1(i)  p1,t(i) unless they are willing to pay the fixed cost k, while the second set
of firms can freely set new prices.
The model assumes, then, that firms are constantly re-evaluating their pricing
strategy, weighing the benefits of holding prices fixed versus the alternative of
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changing prices and incurring the fixed penalty. However, at moment t the firms
belonging to the set of firms that can freely change price are able to choose between
two strategies, depending on whether the inflation rate is moderate or high. At
moderate rates of inflation, or in the face of gradual changes in the monetary stance,
they are more likely to keep their prices constant for two periods and hence avoid
the cost k (single price strategy). On the other hand, in the case of a high inflation,
or in the face of sharp changes in the monetary stance, firms are more likely to
choose a new price and pay the cost k (two price strategy).
We assume a simple linear production technology yt(i)  lt(i), where yt(i) and
lt(i) are output of firm i and the labour used to produce it, respectively. Let us denote
aggregate output as Yt, then equilibrium profits at time t for firm i are given by,
Dt(i)  [pt(i)  Wt] (pt(i)Mt )b C1bt  It(i)Wt(i)k . (10)
While, in equilibrium, the units of labour supplied to each firm at nominal wage
Wt are given by:
nt(i)  Y1bt (pt(i)Mt )b  It(i)Wt(i)k ,
where
It(i)  {1, if the firm pays the cost of price adjustment k at moment t ;0, if the firm does not pays the cost k at moment t .
1.3 Single Price Strategy
Under this strategy we may think of firm i choosing pt(i) so as to maximize the
following expression:
Πt(i)  Dt(i)  βEt(λt1λt)Dt1(i) , (11)
which follows from Equation (9), and implies that prices are set to maximize market
value. We then set γ  1, substitute Equation (7), Equation (8), the quantity equation
and goods market equilibrium into Equation (10). It then follows that the price for
firm i that will be used for two consecutive time periods is:
pt(i)  bb  1
Mbt Y 1bt  βEt Mbt1 Y 1bt1
Mb1t Y 2bαt  βEt Mb1t1 Y 2bαt1
. (12)
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This equation is familiar from the New Keynesian economics. It basically says that
the optimal price will be a function of current and future anticipated demand and
costs conditions, and where in steady state price will be a fixed mark-up over
marginal costs. As is familiar in models of monopolistic competition based on Dixit–
Stiglitz preferences, the mark-up is constant and determined by the elasticity of
demand (that is, tied down via the preference side of the model), the lower the
elasticity, the higher the mark-up.
1.4 Two Price Strategy
In this case the firm chooses the price pt(i) to maximize profits in each period
Πt(i)  Dt(i) . (13)
The optimising price in this case is given by:
pt(i)  bb  1
Mt
Y1αt
. (14)
Here we see that prices are a mark-up as before; now it is only current period
demand and cost conditions that are relevant.
2. MODEL CALIBRATION AND BENCHMARK RESULTS UNDER
PERFECT FORESIGHT
The calibration of the model follows Ireland (1997). We set α  0.1 so that the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution follows Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988).
As in Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) b  6, corresponding to a benchmark value
of 1.2 for the steady state mark-up. Following Ball and Mankiw (1994), each
interval of time in the model corresponds to a period of six months, determining
the choice of β  0.97, consistent with an annual discount rate of 5%. k, the inflation
rate at which the rigidity of individual goods prices vanishes (i.e., firms switch from
the single price strategy to the two price strategy) is set at 0.1075. Finally, we
assume γ  1.
We study the effect of a monetary policy that brings money growth to zero over
some horizon. This was the approach adopted by Ireland (1997), following Ball
(1994). Specifically, at period 0, the authorities make a surprise announcement about
the path for the money supply, {MAs }Ts0, such that by time period T inflation will
be zero. The superscript A indicates the ‘announced’ level of the money supply.
This announced path for the money supply, in turn, implies a gradual decrease in
the growth rate of the money supply. Let θt denote the growth rate of the money stock
at time t. We study, then, processes for the money growth rate of the following sort:
θt  θt1 
θ  1
T
, (15)
54 : MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING
for any value of t from 0 to T  1, where θ1 is equal to the initial rate of inflation,
and where θt  T  1. So, a horizon of time T  1 entails immediate disinflation, while
for T  1 the policymakers engineer a more gradual path towards price stability.
Figure 1 shows the effect of an immediate disinflation on output when the initial
inflation rate is 3% (the dashed line) and when the initial rate is 200% (the solid
line, which is coincident with the x-axis). We see that at relatively low rates of
inflation, this is quite costly as firms follow a single price strategy. The ‘hump-
shaped’ response is due to the fact that the first set of firms to set new prices increase
their price; past inflation has eroded their relative real price and now they face a
relatively large increase in demand for their products (since the firms that do not re-
price have relatively high prices and hence relatively low demand). At higher
rates of initial inflation, firms re-price every period (two price strategy) and hence
disinflation can proceed with no relative-price distortion.
Figures 2 and 3 show the effects of a gradual disinflation from 3% and 200%,
respectively. After the initial drop in output, a gradual disinflation leads to a boom
in output–a relatively prolonged period of above steady state output. Agents set
prices for two periods, and because inflation will be lower in the future, they set lower
prices today, causing a boom. At high initial rates of inflation, the loss in output in the
initial periods can be substantial. The problem is that with gradual disinflation
from high rates of inflation, firms do not initially change their prices.
Finally, Figure 4 shows the optimal speed of disinflation for initial inflation rates
between 1% and 20%. From various initial levels of inflation we calculate the level
utility associated with different speeds of disinflation. During big inflations firms
are more likely to follow a two price strategy and hence under perfect foresight
disinflation is costless. On the other hand, at relatively low rates firms are more
likely to follow a single price strategy and rapid disinflation is more likely to
Fig. 1. Effects of Immediate Disinflation on Output under Perfect Foresight
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Fig. 2. Output effects of gradual disinflation under perfect foresight. Initial annual inflation rate 3%, T  6
be costly. It turns out that the optimal equilibrium strategy for each initial inflation
reported is the single price strategy (although two price strategies were employed
along a number of sub-optimal disinflation paths). At very high rates of inflation
(not reported) the two price strategy is optimal. We return to what determines the
optimal speed of disinflation below.
3. IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY
In this section we consider what might happen when credibility is imperfect, but
nevertheless improving through time. We run variants of the above experiments in
Fig. 3. Output effects of gradual disinflation under perfect foresight. Initial annual inflation rate 200%, T  6
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Fig. 4. Optimal Speed of Disinflation
an environment where the probability mass characterizing agents’ subjective expecta-
tions is shifting through time onto the central bank’s announced money supply path.
Introducing uncertainty into our framework results in some computational complex-
ity which an appendix discusses.1 Again the policy employed is to lower money
growth linearly to zero over some time horizon, T ≥ 1. To retain computational
manageability, we assume that agents perceive only two possible outcomes. One
outcome is the monetary authority’s announced path for the money supply. The other
outcome is a reversion to an alternative, more inflationary, path for the money
supply. There are two obvious choices for this alternative path: first, agents perceive
the authorities as reverting to the previous steady state inflation rate. Second,
alternatively, they fear the government will ‘run out of steam’ such that at time t (for
0  t  T) the growth rate of the money stock will be equal to the growth rate
between t – 1 and t. Algebraically, we can characterize these alternate expectations
as follows:
Etj1 Mtj  ρtj θ1 Mtj1  (1  ρtj) MAtj ; (16)
Etj1 Mtj  ρtj θt1 Mtj1  (1  ρtj)MAtj . (17)
We will assume that the authorities stick to the announced path of disinflation, so
in practice Equation (16) and Equation (17) may be rewritten as:
Etj1 Mtj  ρtj θ1 MAtj1  (1  ρtj) MAtj ;
Etj1 Mtj  ρtj θt1 MAtj1  (1  ρtj) MAtj .
In characterizing {ρs}TJs0 we need to decide on ρ0, a measure of the initial level
of credibility, the time it takes until ρTJ  0, for J ≥ 0, and the path of ρs in the
1. This appendix is available on Nolan’s website: http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/∼cn14/home.htm.
ANAMARIA NICOLAE AND CHARLES NOLAN : 57
transition between these extrema. One option is simply to let ρs converge linearly
to zero in the following way:
ρt  ρt1  α
ρ0
N
t ≥ 1 , (18)
where, N is the period of the disinflation (measured in half years) and α ∈ (0, 1).
α captures the time it takes for agents to believe completely the central bank’s
announcements–i.e., for a perfect foresight equilibrium to obtain. However, there
may be more plausible characterizations.2 The following function is useful for
capturing such paths:
ρt  (1)δ k(a2  (t  δa)2)
1
2  δρ0 , (19)
where, δ  0 or 1.3 In the event δ  0 it can be shown that ρt follows the simple
recursive process:
ρt k  {(ρt1 k)2  (1  2t)}
1
2
. (20)
On the other hand, if δ  1 then we have:
ρt k  {((ρt1  ρ0) k)2  [1  2(t  a)]}
1
2  ρ0 k . (21)
Given ρ0, Equation (20) plots the path {ρs}Ts0 as a concave function. This captures
the intuitive idea that agents may be reluctant to update their priors initially. However,
as time goes by and the central bank sticks to its announced money supply targets,
they increasingly come to believe the announced target path. We shall refer to
this case as concave (expectations) updating.4 On the other hand, Equation (21)
reflects a population, although happy to accept that the monetary authority dislikes
the current relatively high rate of inflation, nevertheless worries that as the slope
of the short-run Phillips curve flattens the monetary authority may be tempted to
renege. The importance of the exploitability of the Phillips curve has been empha-
sized by Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) and is a crucial factor in high inflation
equilibria in games of the Barro and Gordon (1983) sort.5 We refer to this as convex
(expectations) updating.
We still have two difficult questions to answer. First, what is a reasonable value
for ρ0, and at what point T do we have ρs≥T  0, ∀s; how credible is the authority’s
announcement at date zero, and how long does it take for agents to ‘arrive’ at perfect
2. This linear path for ρ leads to results intermediate between those which we label below as
‘concave’ and ‘convex’. The results showing this are available on request.
3. It can be shown that a  N and k  N/ρ0.
4. That is, ρ plots as a concave function of time on the x–y plane, where the x-axis measures time.
5. Intermediate cases are possible to imagine, such as a truncated bell-shaped path for ρ. This would
capture a situation in which agents initially place little weight on the authority’s announcements, as in
Equation (20). However, after some time (characterized by an inflexion in the path of ρ), agents once
again become more sceptical, as in Equation (21). We ignore these alternate paths.
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foresight? We know of no studies that we can easily draw on to parameterize
Functions (20) and (21), so our approach has been to analyze the outcome of various
thought experiments under many different parameterizations and to present the
results we believe to be robust. For now we assume that ρ0  1,6 and that ρT  0
after three years.7 In Section 5 we shall attempt to parameterize our learning rules
using the experience of the U.S. in the early 1980s.
4. THE EFFECT OF IMPERFECT CREDIBILITY
4.1 Concave Expectations Updating under Equation (16)
In all of the charts that follow the dashed line is the perfect foresight case, and
the solid line is the imperfect credibility case. Figure 5 compares the path of output
under perfect foresight and concave expectations updating, given an initial inflation
rate of 3%.
The contraction in output is more pronounced and more protracted under imperfect
credibility. And even though by period 6 agents in both economies have the same
information, the effects of imperfect credibility remain for some time due to
the overlapping nature of price setting.
One of the potentially counterfactual implications of the perfect foresight case,
as emphasized by Ball (1994, 1995), is the implication of the ‘disinflationary boom’:
i.e., the tendency for output to rise above its new steady state level under a gradual
disinflation as agents anticipate lower future price-levels.
Fig. 5. Output effects of immediate disinflation under concave learning. Initial annual inflation rate 3%. Three years
to perfect foresight
6. We experimented with a number of different initial values for ρ0. The results were virtually
unchanged for values of ρ0 as low as 0.5.
7. If ρ takes a longer time to reach zero, output obviously also takes a longer time to reach its new
steady state level. Our assumption implies agents finally believe completely the anouncement when, and
only when, price stability is actually achieved.
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Figure 6 shows that under concave updating this effect may vanish as output falls
more sharply and does not rise above its new steady state value along the transition
path. Agents only gradually come to realise that the price-level is to grow at a zero
rate–a realization that is all the more tardy because of the gradualness of the
disinflationary process itself. For very high initial inflation rates, the fall in output
following an immediate disinflation is catastrophic as Figure 7 demonstrates and it is
also of a similar order of magnitude under a more gradual disinflation, as Figure 8
shows.
Given the extra cost imposed by imperfect credibility, what is the quantitative
impact on the optimal speed of disinflation? Figure 9 reveals that a good ‘rule-of-
thumb’ is that disinflations from initial rates between 2% and 11% should take an
extra year, as compared with the perfect foresight case. In contrast for inflation rates
above 12% and less than or equal to 1% the optimal speed of disinflation is indistin-
guishable from the perfect foresight case.
The key reason that gradual disinflations are attractive is that, with some price
stickiness and under perfect foresight, they often imply prolonged periods of
above trend output and consumption. However, as the initial inflation rate rises the
contraction in output in the early periods of the disinflation is more pronounced,
increasingly offsetting the utility gain from the subsequent boom–the optimal speed of
disinflation rises.
Under imperfect credibility, the initial contraction in output is more severe for
any initial inflation rate than is the case under perfect foresight. Furthermore, the
utility gain from the disinflationary boom may be absent. It turns out that a more
gradual period of disinflation is optimal up until an initial inflation rate of around
12%. For initial inflation rates greater than 12% the optimal speed of disinflation
is the same as under perfect foresight.
In short, therefore, under perfect foresight gradual disinflations are primarily about
reaping the utility from output gains following an initial contraction in activity, while
Fig. 6. Output effects of gradual disinflation over three years under concave learning. Initial annual inflation rate
3%, T  6. Three years to perfect foresight
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Fig. 7. Output effects of immediate disinflation under concave learning. Initial annual inflation rate 200%. Three
years to perfect foresight
under imperfect credibility a primary concern is avoiding over-sharp contractions in
activity in the early period of the disinflation.
4.2 Convex Expectations Updating under Equation (16)
Many of the same qualitative results found under concave updating are present
with convex updating. However, as is apparent from Figures 10–13, the outturns
look closer to the case of perfect foresight compared with concave updating. The
reason for this is that the convex path of ρ means that agents avoid some of
the more costly mistakes early on in the disinflation that may occur under con-
cave updating.
Figure 10 shows that the drop in output under immediate disinflation leads to a
drop in output more severe than, but close to, that under perfect foresight.
Fig. 8. Output effects of gradual disinflation under concave learning. Initial annual inflation rate 200%, T  6.
Three years to perfect foresight
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Fig. 9. Optimal Speed of Disinflation
This tendency for agents to believe the authorities when they announce decreases in
the rate of growth of money also permits disinflationary booms to occur, as Figure 11
shows, for ‘moderate’ rates of inflation whilst such booms are absent for higher
initial rates of inflation, as Figure 12 demonstrates.
The optimal speed of disinflation, Figure 13, is closer to the case of perfect
foresight than under concave expectations updating.
4.3 Concave and Convex Expectations Updating under Equation (17)
Under Equation (17) agents expect the disinflation policy to stall such that there
is some probability that next period’s inflation will equal this period’s. We found
Fig. 10. Output effects of immediate disinflation under convex learning. Initial annual inflation rate 3%. Three years
to perfect foresight
62 : MONEY, CREDIT, AND BANKING
Fig. 11. Output effects of gradual disinflation under convex learning. Initial annual inflation rate 3%. Three years
to perfect foresight
that because the initial expectational errors are smaller than that under Equation
(16), the results tend to be closer to those found under perfect foresight; deflationary
booms are more likely to occur under Equation (17). As before, concave updating
tends to make these booms disappear,8 although this is now less likely to occur
than under Equation (16). For example, Figure 14 compares the effects of gradual
disinflation under perfect foresight (dashed line) with concave learning under Equa-
tion (16), the bottom line; and with concave learning under Equation (17), the
middle line.
Fig. 12. Output effects of gradual disinflation under convex learning. Initial annual inflation rate 200%, T  6.
Three years to perfect foresight
8. We do not present the results in detail, but they are, in chart form, available upon request.
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Fig. 13. Optimal Speed of Disinflation
5. THE VOLCKER DISINFLATION AND THE OPTIMAL SPEED
OF DISINFLATION9
In Sections 3 and 4 we adopted a number of different expectations updating rules.
In this section we attempt to use the experience of the U.S. in the early 1980s to
look at, for this period at least, what might be an empirically plausible version of
the expectations updating rule.
Between late 1979 and 1985 inflation in the U.S. fell, broadly speaking, from
10% to 4%, and has subsequently fallen further. This reduction in the inflation rate
Fig. 14. Output effects of gradual disinflation under concave learning. Initial annual inflation rate 3%, T  6. Three
years to perfect foresight
9. We would like to thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the analysis that we undertake in
this section.
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was costly, as measures of the output gap from this period indicate. In this section,
we take a first pass at the issue: might the Volcker disinflation have been too rapid?
To do this we assume that the initial steady state inflation was 10% (around the
highest level that actual U.S. inflation reached before coming down), and that Volcker
intended to reduce inflation to 2% (close to the average inflation rate since 1984).
We use the currency component of M1 from 1979 until 1984 as the path for the
money stock during the disinflation. Given this path and assuming perfect foresight
we calculate the flexible price-level of output of our model. We then back out a
learning process such that the output gap in our model tracks the actual U.S.
output gap. Given that learning process we can then calculate the optimal speed
of disinflation.
The dashed line in Figure 15 is the U.S. output gap as measured by the OECD.
The solid line is the output gap of our model. To generate such a sharp contraction
in output we had to adopt a somewhat extreme form of concave learning, where
agents to not believe the ‘announced’ money supply growth rates for almost
the whole course of the disinflation (5 years), and then in the course of year six,
believe entirely the announced path. And even then we cannot quite generate the
sharpness of the contraction indicated in the OECD data; although both measures
of the output gap bottom out in 1982, the model output gap at the trough is 1%
less than the OECD estimate.
The optimal speed of disinflation from an initial rate of inflation of 10% to 2%
under perfect foresight is three and half years. In contrast the optimal speed under
the learning process implied above is seven years. Our calculations suggest that
even had the disinflation taken longer than it actually did the output losses would
have been only marginally lower.
Clearly one needs to be cautious in an exercise such as this as we are squeezing
real world data into a highly simplified framework, but we think these results are
indicative. It appears that once inflation has risen substantially, imperfect credibility
makes sizeable output losses in the transition to price stability highly likely, even
when the speed of disinflation is ‘optimal’. In a related analysis Erceg and Levin (2003)
come to some similar conclusions. They examine the Volcker disinflation under the
assumption that agents use optimal filtering to disentangle persistent changes in
the inflation target from temporary shocks to the monetary policy rule. Unlike in the
current set up, in their model the steady state is unchanged throughout this period.
However, leaving aside this important difference,10 they also find as we do that
sizeable output losses may be the price of imperfect credibility.
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
We think two results stand out from our investigation. First, we find that imperfect
credibility and price stickiness are jointly neither necessary nor sufficient for mone-
tary contractions to cause lengthy recessions, at least for the relatively modest initial
10. The difference may be important for the sorts of reasons discussed in Albanesi, Chari, and
Christiano (2003).
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levels of inflation under scrutiny here. In this sense our results conflict with that of
Ball (1995).
Second, in our model imperfect credibility need not be an overriding concern to
the policymaker initiating a period of disinflation; under imperfect credibility the
optimal speed of disinflation is quite similar to the case of perfect foresight. That
said, under concave expectations updating initially sharp falls in output were a
concern for the policymaker. Under convex updating, and perfect foresight, the
optimal speed of disinflation was driven to a large extent by the protracted period
of above steady state output.
What is central to both of these results is the size of the expectational errors early
on in the regime shift relative to the degree of price stickiness. For a given
level of imperfect credibility longer nominal contract length will generally imply
sharper recessions following a monetary contraction. Under convex updating these
initial errors are relatively small while under concave updating they are
somewhat larger.
Future research might investigate three issues. First, how large does the initial
fall in output have to be before it is optimal for the policymaker to renege on the
announcement to attain price stability. We accommodated this issue by focussing
on situations where the initial rate of inflation was relatively modest. For countries
with very high initial inflation rates, however, reneging might well be optimal,
as Figure 7 strongly suggests.
A second issue concerns the interaction between monetary and fiscal policies.
We side-stepped this issue altogether by ignoring distortionary taxation of real
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activity. Again, so long as initial inflation, and hence seigniorage, is relatively modest
the fiscal implications of disinflation are probably limited. As initial inflation
rises, the public sector budget constraint is likely to play an increasing role in the
welfare calculus.
A final issue concerns how quickly agents actually take to learn about regime
shifts. In this paper we picked what we thought were sensible scenarios. In truth,
we know relatively little about such issues, although in Section 5 we make a tentative
first step in this direction as do Erceg and Levin (2003). Given its importance to
our results, this is an important topic for future research.
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